Do leadership perceptions of relative power distribution in a competitive system tend to differ from the objective distribution of power in that system? If so, how does this difference influence our understanding of the connection between relative power and state behavior? In this article, we draw insight from the fields of cognitive, social, and political psychology, diplomatic history, and international relations in order to develop and test a “Perceptions of Power” (PoP) model that more accurately tracks leadership perceptions of relative power in competitive systems. We use and transform capability data from pre-World War One Europe in order to generate PoP scores that track German perceptions of relative power in Europe between 1871 and 1914. We then conduct a systematic and detailed analysis of diplomatic documents from that time period in order to assess the PoP model and demonstrate that it has greater external validity than raw national capability scores. We find that this is particularly the case when it comes to identifying the point in time at which Germany reaches power parity with Great Britain, and accounting for the anxiety that Germans leaders felt because of the specific way in which Russia recovered after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Both of these improvements offer a great deal of insight for scholars that are interested in understanding both the motivation and timing of German strategy in the years prior to World War One. In addition, we are optimistic about the generalizability of the PoP model. In as much as it can be applied to other systems and time periods, it may be able to uncover new ways to connect the systemic distribution of relative power to actual foreign policy outcomes.
Kroenig (2013) finds that in crises between nuclear-armed states, countries possessing nuclear arsenals larger than those of their opponents tend to be victorious. After correcting for coding errors in the dataset and for finite-sample bias in clustered standard error estimates, we show that this relationship no longer holds at conventional levels of statistical significance. We further demonstrate that the observed association between nuclear superiority and crisis victory is extremely sensitive to the author's variable coding decisions and model specifications. Under reasonable alternative coding and model choices, the nuclear superiority finding is no longer present. We find instead that the possession of an assured nuclear second-strike capability is consistently and robustly associated with positive crisis outcomes among nuclear states. Survivability, rather than superiority, appears to be the element of a state's nuclear arsenal that has the most significant bearing on its ability to win nuclear crises.
This working paper focuses on the gendered concepts of women that emerge from the texts of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, especially the concept of “honor and modesty.” Through analysis of historical materials, the paper describes the background to Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which refers to the protection of women from rape and enforced prostitution. In particular, the paper examines the question of why the Conventions’ drafters did not include rape in the list of acts that constitute grave breaches of the Conventions, worthy of special condemnation.
This paper shows that promotion to top jobs dramatically reduce the durability of women’s marriages, but not men’s. For two political jobs – mayor and parliamentarian – we can follow successful and unsuccessful job contenders over time, both before and after the promotion. With this data, we can ascertain common trends in divorce and earnings before the promotion, and use a difference in difference approach to estimate the causal effect of promotion on divorce. To further control for unobservables, we also define a subsample close elections where the promotion is quasi-randomly assigned. For promotions to CEO of private firms, we can only analyze promotion winners, but an event study that compares promoted men and women gives strong supports to our baseline findings. Looking into possible mechanisms, we can rule out that promoted women are differentially “tempted” by new partners after promotion. Instead, it appears that norms and behavior in the marriage market may hinder the closure of the gender gap in the labor market. Divorces do not occur in couples that are more equally matched in terms of age, parental leave, or earnings. Instead they occur in couples where behaviors are more traditional, which is still the case for most relationships.
Established by a three person Reserve Bank Organization Committee (RBOC) in 1914, the structure of the Federal Reserve System has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite criticism at the time and over ensuing decades. This paper examines the selection of cities for Reserve Banks and branches, and of district boundaries. We show that each aspect of the Fed’s structure reflected the preferences of national banks, including adjustments to district boundaries after the Fed was established. Further, using newly-collected information on the locations of each national bank’s correspondents, we find that banker preferences mirrored established interbank connections. The Federal Reserve was thus formed on top of the structure that it was meant to replace.
In this paper we analyze how sources of political influence relate to the actual regulatory treatment of distressed banks and to the expectation of bank support provided by the government. We assemble a unique dataset connecting U.S. banks' sources of influence (e.g., lobbying expenditures, proximity to legislative committee, prior affiliation with regulatory or government institutions) to bank financial data, actual bank supervisory actions and market-inferred expected government support. Employing this novel data, we cast some light on how regulatory decision making is affected by these sources of influence. Our findings suggest that banks' inuence exertion matters for the regulatory treatment of distressed banks as well as for the expectation of support regardless of bank distress. Several conditions increase the effectiveness of sources of influence in actual regulatory treatment: Lobbying activities are more effective with deteriorating capital ratios and with the aid of former politicians; effectiveness of proximity to representatives of legislative committee increases with the amount of campaign contributions from the financial industry. However, there seems to be a limit to the impact of influence when it comes to closure decisions of the most severely distressed banks. Our findings are instructive for understanding the political influence banks can leverage on shaping regulatory decisions, and propose increased attention to the relations between legislators, regulators, and banks.
This paper explores the strategic foundations of separation of powers in the English empire of North America. A hierarchical principal-agent model of this setting demonstrates that imperial governors may extract more rents from colonial settlers than the imperial crown prefers. This lowers the crown's own rents, and inhibits economic development by settlers. Separation of powers within colonies allows settlers to restrain the governor at low direct cost to the crown. This restraint shrinks the share of the economy extracted jointly by the governor and the crown, but may thereby induce greater economic development. When eciency gains of extracting from a larger pie outweigh distributive losses from a smaller crown share, the crown supports separation of powers within colonies. The model highlights the role of agency problems as a distinct factor in New World institutional development.
In the past decade, nearly 20 studies have found a strong, persistent pattern in surveys and behavioral experiments from over 40 countries: individual exposure to war violence tends to increase social cooperation at the local level, including community participation and prosocial behavior. Thus while war has many negative legacies for individuals and societies, it appears to leave a positive legacy in terms of local cooperation and civic engagement. We discuss, synthesize and reanalyze the emerging body of evidence, and weigh alternative explanations. There is some indication that war violence especially enhances in-group or "parochial" norms and preferences, a finding that, if true, suggests that the rising social cohesion we document need not promote broader peace.
The movement of Effective Altruism and social impact investing signifies a shift in philanthropy towards measured impact. GiveDirectly, a nonprofit organization that facilitates unconditional cash transfers to the poor in Kenya and Uganda, operates under the reasonable premise that poor people know what makes them better off. Microfinance institutions operate under the same assumption and provide low-interest loans to the poor. Models of providing poor people with funds through unconstrained donations or microloans tout how the funds are often used to start businesses. Research suggests that this is true in practice and, more importantly, that business creation is an important component of economic development.
These models, however, neglect the influence of culture on the use of funds. Some empirical research has already shown that culture influences how people spend money. It is plausible that members of ‘interdependent’ communities allocate a smaller proportion of their income to personal spending due to a social stigma in comparison to ‘individual’ communities. This phenomenon plausibly extends to the use of unconstrained funds that are either donated or loaned. This research project will study the relationship between cultures of interdependence and spending. It will investigate the question: how does interdependence in a community influence the ways in which community members spend donated or loaned funds?
 Canales, Rodrigo, Dean Karlan, and Tony Sheldon. "What Are the Realities of Microfinance?" Yale School of Management. N.p., 20 Sept. 2016. Web. 18 Dec. 2016.
This paper examines the adoption of income taxes by Western economies since the 19th century. We identify two empirical regularities that challenge predictions of existing models of taxation and redistribution: while countries with low levels of electoral enfranchisement and high levels of landholding inequality adopt the income tax first, countries with more extensive electoral rules lag behind in adopting these new forms of taxation. We propose an explanation of income tax adoption that accounts for these empirical regularities. We discuss the most important economic consideration of politicians linked to owners of different factors, namely, the shift of the tax burden between sectors, and examine how pre-existing electoral rules affect these political calculations. The paper provides both a cross-national test of this argument and a micro-historical test that examines the economic and political determinants of support for the adoption of the income tax in 1842 in Britain.
This paper studies whether crony governance affects the logic behind governments’ targeting of violence, and how the deployment of violence allows politically connected firms to benefit from crony governance. We address these issues in the context of the Argentine military junta that took power on March 24, 1976. Specifically, we examine the logic driving the choice of firm level union representatives who were subjected to violence following the coup. Using an original dataset assembled and digitized by us, we find that political, business and social connections to the regime are associated with an increase of 2 to 3 times in the number of firm level union representatives arrested and/or disappeared. This is the case even after controlling for a battery of firms’ characteristics that capture alternative explanations for the targeting of violence. The effect is particularly pronounced in privately owned (as opposed to state-owned) firms, suggesting that the correlation is driven by cronyism for financial gain rather than ideology or information transmission. We also show that connected firms benefited from violence against union representatives by subsequently having less strikes and a higher market valuation. Our findings highlight the pervasiveness of ties to the government, even in cases where one of the main stated goals of the regime is to curb cronyism.
Why did the country that borrowed the most industrialize first? Earlier research has viewed the explosion of debt in 18th century Britain as either detrimental, or as neutral for economic growth. In this paper, we argue instead that Britain’s borrowing boom was beneficial. The massive issuance of liquidly traded bonds allowed the nobility to switch out of low-return investments such as agricultural improvements. This switch lowered factor demand by old sectors and increased profits in new, rising ones such as textiles and iron. Because external financing contributed little to the Industrial Revolution, this boost in profits in new industries accelerated structural change, making Britain more industrial more quickly. The absence of an effective transfer of financial resources from old to new sectors also helps to explain why the Industrial Revolution led to massive social change – because the rich nobility did not lend to or invest in the revolutionizing industries, it failed to capture the high returns to capital in these sectors, leading to relative economic decline.