Gender and Dynastic Political Recruitment: Theory and Evidence∗

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Abstract

Throughout history and across countries, women appear more likely to enter politics at the heels of a close relative or spouse. We introduce a theoretical model that integrates political selection with information asymmetry across social categories to derive predictions for the roots and impact of this dynastic bias in women’s recruitment. Comparative legislator-level data from twelve democracies and candidate-level data from Ireland and Sweden support the idea that dynastic ties fill the role of overcoming information asymmetry, as indicated by a declining gender gap in dynasties over time, and following the introduction of a gender quota in Sweden. We find evidence that dynastic ties help women overcome a vote disadvantage in elections, and that the quality of predecessors may be used to recruit female dynastic successors. Finally, we show that dynastic women have higher observable qualifications than dynastic men, contradicting an alternative explanation that elites appoint dynastic women as proxies.

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1 Introduction

The descriptive representation of women is on the rise. More than a hundred countries and political parties have adopted gender quotas, and the proportion of women in parliament around the world has doubled over the last ten years, from 11 percent to 22 percent.\(^1\) Among heads of state and heads of government, women have also made inroads. Today, women make up roughly 8 percent of all presidents and prime ministers.

The slow but steady inflow of women into political power has been accompanied by a heightened research interest in the topic of gender representation—not only in descriptive terms, but also in substantive and symbolic terms.\(^2\) Important theoretical frameworks for explaining women’s (under)representation in politics include the “supply and demand model” (e.g., Norris and Lovenduski, 1995), and more recently, “feminist institutionalism” (e.g., Krook, 2010; Krook and MacKay, 2011). Empirically, a large body of work has shown that women’s descriptive representation is higher under proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, and when parties or countries adopt gender quotas with placement mandates (e.g., Rule, 1987; Matland, 1998; Reynolds, 1999; Salmond, 2006; Krook, 2006; Rosen, 2013).

A separate stream of the literature has focused on which women tend to seek and win office (e.g., Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011), with a particular focus on the merits and qualifications of female politicians. If parties are assumed to make meritocratic selection decisions, and voters are assumed to choose the most qualified candidate, then a lack of women in political office might be taken as a reflection of a lack of merit among female candidates. Although this debate is hardly settled, a forceful objection has come from studies claiming that voters and parties are negatively biased against women. To overcome that bias, women often need to be more qualified than men in order to reach the same level of support from voters and parties, at least until they have a chance to prove

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\(^1\)According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org).

\(^2\)Indeed, entire journals—Gender & Politics and the Journal of Women, Politics & Policy—are now devoted to these research areas.
their true merits (e.g., Anzia and Berry, 2011; Beaman et al., 2012; Folke and Rickne, 2016).

Yet, despite this recent boom in theoretical and empirical research on gender representation, one of the most striking differences in women’s paths to power remains largely unexplored. Across multiple countries and contexts, women in politics appear to be more likely than their male counterparts to have close family ties to a previous or current politician (most often male). In other words, women are more likely than men to be “dynastic.” Researchers have established this pattern among political executives (Jalalzai, 2013), in the national legislatures of countries as diverse as the United States, Ireland, and India (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978; Smith and Martin, 2016; Basu, 2016), and among local-level executives in the Philippines (Labonne, Parsa and Querubin, 2015).

The size of the divide in the United States Congress is such that one in three women have been dynastic, compared to just one in ten men (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009). Nevertheless, we still lack a concrete theoretical understanding for the pattern, let alone its consequences for representation.

In this paper, we make three contributions with regard to the dynastic bias in women’s political representation. First, we assemble unique legislator-level panel data from twelve democracies to give the most comprehensive overview to date of this descriptive pattern across countries and over time. Second, we develop a theoretical model to explain the bias. This model is tested on candidate-level data from two country cases, Ireland and Sweden, and yields evidence in support of the theory in these two very different institutional settings. Third, we use our theory and data to provide entirely novel insights about the relationship between dynastic recruitment and two important academic and public discussions about women’s political representation: 1) differences in the qualifications of

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3A good example is Hillary Clinton, who, though capable in her own right, owes much of her political success to her marriage to former President Bill Clinton. Prominent examples from other countries include Indira Gandhi of India, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Yingluck Shinawatra of Thailand, and Park Geun-hye of South Korea.

4Labonne, Parsa and Querubin (2015) find that term limits for mayors led to a sharp increase in female mayors. However, a whopping 70 percent of the new female mayors were dynastic.
men and women in politics, and 2) the effect of gender quotas.

The core of the paper is the theoretical model, which has two essential building blocks. The first, inspired by seminal work on the historical development of women’s entry into labor markets, is that the true merits of women, as a group, are less known to recruiters in those markets for the simple fact that women are newcomers (e.g., Goldin, 2014). In political markets, the recruiters form part of the selectorate, which is made up of party selectors and voters. In the absence of perfect information, the selectorate imputes the quality of a female candidate based on the average quality of past female candidates. For male candidates, individual merits are relatively better understood due to the incumbency of men in the political market.

The second essential piece of our theory is that the selectorate can use the merits of a candidate’s dynastic “senior,” i.e., a candidate’s family member who has previously served in politics, as an important informational cue. This idea is similar in spirit to the concept of information shortcuts in previous work on political recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). It is also consistent with general theories of dynastic recruitment where reputations are passed down through generations (Feinstein, 2010; Smith, 2012; Asako et al., 2015; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2013). An important addition we make is that the information contained in the dynastic relationship is used in an asymmetrical fashion across gender. A woman who has a dynastic senior is evaluated at the (higher) level of the senior’s merits rather than the (lower) average merits of all women. The differential impact of this imputation is less pronounced for men, whose actual merits, as a group, are known to a greater degree by the selectorate.

We test the key conjecture of our model—that the quality of dynastic seniors is used to impute the quality of female candidates, but less so for male candidates—on our candidate-level data from Ireland and Sweden. These two cases feature excellent candidate-level data on dynastic ties. For Ireland, the data are based on carefully re-searched biographical information. For Sweden, we make use of government-maintained personal identification codes (akin to social security numbers); these codes perfectly mea-
sure all types of family ties within the universe of Swedish politicians. The two cases also feature distinct electoral contexts and selectorates: a candidate-centered, single-transferable vote (STV) system in Ireland where voters are ultimately responsible for electing individual politicians into office, and a more party-centered context of PR in Sweden, where candidate-level preference voting is optional for voters, but initial party list rank is more important in determining who gets elected.

In the candidate-centered electoral context of Ireland, we find that much of the vote disadvantage for female candidates is erased if a female candidate is dynastic. We also find that voters appear to impute candidate quality from dynastic seniors to dynastic juniors in the case of women, but less so for men. Similar results are found for Sweden, where the recruitment of dynastic women can be tied to four different measures of the quality of the dynastic senior. These relationships are absent, in all four cases, for male dynastic juniors. Interestingly, the utilization of a dynastic senior’s quality to evaluate women occurs both among voters, the main selectorate in Ireland’s candidate-centered system, and among party elites and party members in Sweden’s more party-centered system.

After testing the core predictions of the model, we derive two implications for the impact of dynastic recruitment on the qualifications of elected politicians. The model predicts that dynastic women will be more qualified than dynastic men, suggesting that the gender imbalance in dynastic recruitment is not associated with the selection of unqualified women. However, the model also suggests that dynastic men and women will have lower competence than their non-dynastic counterparts. The first prediction finds support in both the Irish and Swedish cases, but the second fails in both cases. Both dynastic men and women have higher levels of education, on average, than their non-dynastic peers. Although the support for the model is mixed, both sets of results go squarely against the idea that dynastic women with low levels of education are recruited into politics to serve as “proxies” or placeholders for the political influence of male elites (c.f., Schwindt-Bayer, 2011; Jalalzai, 2013; Ban and Rao, 2008).
In a second extension, we consider the impact of gender quotas, which have been called the “electoral reform of our generation,” and have been introduced in roughly 75 countries and 130 political parties (Krook, 2009). Research on gender quotas has often touched upon the topic of dynastic recruitment (e.g., Dahlerup, 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Tripp, Konaté and Lowe-Morna, 2006; Vincent, 2004; Zetterberg, 2008), but quantitative studies are rare due to the lack of high-quality, high-coverage data on family ties between politicians. In addition, most quotas were only recently adopted, and thus offer scarce opportunities to evaluate post-reform patterns.

Our theoretical model can be extended to predict that the imposition of a quota should (temporarily) increase the recruitment of dynastic women, a prediction which we test using our Swedish data. In 1994, the Social Democratic Party (SAP) introduced a zipper quota across 290 local parties, obligating these parties to alternate male and female names on their ballot. The substantial number of post-reform years of data now available, and the fact that the quota was introduced by the Central Party Board, whose hand was forced by a break-out feminist party, offers an excellent opportunity to study the causal impact of the quota on women’s recruitment at the local level (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016; Folke, Freidenvall and Rickne, 2015). Our analysis shows that the quota led to a quantitatively small, but positive increase in the recruitment of dynastic women. However, we also find that this effect was temporary, with recruitment patterns reversing to their pre-quota level within two elections after the quota.

Our theory and empirical findings make novel contributions to several research literatures, but most importantly to the area of political recruitment. Our theoretical framework introduces the mechanism of information asymmetry as a cause of gender differences in political representation. We also suggest a previously unexplored role for dynastic ties as information channels that are used in an asymmetrical fashion across

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5 See also the Quota Project (www.quotaproject.org).
6 Ireland introduced a 30 percent gender quota for female candidates in 2016, which slightly increased the overall number of women, as well as the proportion of dynastic women in the incumbent party (Fine Gael), but there has not been enough time or variation to evaluate the long-term impact (as in the Swedish case).
groups of candidates. The role of dynastic ties as a signaling device helps to explain the persistence of dynastic recruitment in modern democracies, as well as the dynastic bias in gender representation. It can also offer a useful point of departure for future studies of the entry of other political minorities that have made inroads into the political arena, but differ in access to dynastic signals, such as young people, ethnic and racial minorities, or immigrants.

2 Gender and Dynastic Recruitment around the World

In this section, we draw on panel data from twelve democracies to document the empirical patterns in the gender gap in dynastic recruitment across countries and time. Our cross-country data cover all legislators (MPs) elected between 1945-2016 in Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States (a total of 69,680 observations). For bicameral systems, we exclude upper chambers and focus only on the more important lower chamber. A dynastic “junior” is defined as an MP who was preceded into national office by a relative, either by blood or marriage. Preceding relatives may include upper chamber members, cabinet ministers or presidents, but not local-level politicians. Information on dynastic ties are drawn primarily from official biographical information available through parliamentary libraries or online biographical dictionaries.7

To examine the dynastic bias in women’s political representation, we compute the ratio of dynastic MPs among the women and men in each country’s legislature in each election period. We then average these ratios across all elections and compute the difference, i.e., the proportion of dynastic women among the women, minus the proportion of dynastic men among the men: \( \frac{\text{Number of dynastic women}}{\text{Number of all women}} - \frac{\text{Number of dynastic men}}{\text{Number of all men}} \). These differences are plotted in the left-hand graph of Figure 1. On the right-hand side, we give a stylized description of the variation over time by instead dividing the data into time periods:

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7Further details about the data sources for each country are available in Online Appendix Section A.
Figure 1: The dynastic bias in women’s political representation in twelve democracies, 1945-2016.

Note: The dynastic bias is measured as \( \frac{\text{Number of dynastic women}}{\text{Number of all women}} - \frac{\text{Number of dynastic men}}{\text{Number of all men}} \). Data sources are explained in Online Appendix Section A, which also contains plots of the time trend in the dynastic bias within each country in Online Appendix Figure A.1.

Using the difference in ratios from the full time period, we find that dynastic recruitment is more common among women than among men in eight out of the twelve countries. Splitting the data into two time periods, the right-hand side of the figure shows that the average dynastic bias decreased between these two time periods in all but three countries: Israel, Norway, and Switzerland, all places where the dynastic bias in gender representation was already comparatively small.
3 A Signaling Theory of Gender and Dynastic Recruitment

In this section, we outline our theoretical framework to explain the dynastic bias in gender representation. Our theory combines elements from labor economics and political science, in particular empirical and theoretical insights about the roles of gender and family ties in political recruitment. The model posits that dynastic ties mediate political selection in a context of imperfect information.  

3.1 The Selection Function

At the core of our theoretical model is a selection equation that relates the qualifications of a candidate to his or her probability of election. Following Bueno De Mesquita and Smith (2005), we assume that a sub-group of citizens, the selectorate, evaluates the qualifications of candidates and determines if they are selected or not. In party-centered electoral systems with closed or semi-closed ballots, party members and party elites weigh more heavily in the selectorate. These groups rank candidates on the party ballot and the rank-order determines who is elected as seats are counted from the top of the list. In candidate-centered systems, the sub-group of citizens that make up the selectorate at the candidate selection stage may be party elites or primary voters, but the general population of voters plays the role of the selectorate to ultimately determine which candidates get elected into office. Regardless of the electoral system, the selectorate can be assumed to prefer candidates with higher “valence” (Stokes, 1963; Groseclose, 2001; Besley, 2005), a composite characteristic of skills and integrity. Recent empirical work supports this idea of positive selection into politics (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Dal Bó et al., 2016).

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8 Our model focuses on the demand side of political selection (i.e., by the selectorate). Supply-side factors may include political ambition, capital, policy motivations, or a family history in politics (Norris, 1997). Nevertheless, the empirical patterns uncovered in our study do not suggest that a supply difference across genders, propelled by family histories in politics, is likely to be a key explanation for the dynastic bias in gender recruitment. We discuss these issues in Section 7.

9 The selectorate can be expanded when the process is “democratized” to include party-level primaries, as in countries like Israel (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).
We formalize the selectorate’s evaluation of female and male candidates in a simple equation, letting the sub-index $g$ denote gender ($F$ or $M$), and the sub-index $i$ denote the individual politician. The selectorate’s evaluation $\hat{V}_i$ of each candidate is determined as:

$$\hat{V}_i = I_g \ast \bar{V}_g + (1 - I_g)V_i,$$

where $V_i$ represents the true qualifications of the candidate, $\bar{V}_g$ represents the average qualifications among women and men in the population, and $I_g$ is a parameter that measures the accuracy of the selectorate’s information on the true qualifications of men and women. The formula describes the evaluation of a candidate as the weighted average of the individual’s true quality and the average quality of all persons of the candidate’s gender. How much weight is put on the group average is given by $I_g$, which we call the “ignorance parameter.” This parameter is higher for women than for men, an assumption that follows from theoretical and empirical work that spans several research disciplines (e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999; Goldin, 2014). The intuition is that the political arena, like other labor markets, is a male-dominated institution that has only recently been opened to female candidates. When a new social group enters a labor market in this way, the qualifications of individuals in that group (women) are less known compared to groups (men) who are incumbent actors on the market. Research on political parties has also shown that party elites are less informed about women than men as candidates (Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Niklasson, 2005; Bjarnegaard, 2009).\(^{10}\)

A larger amount of ignorance regarding an individual woman’s true qualifications implies that the selectorate will rely more on their knowledge about women in general—the average perceived qualifications of women, $\bar{V}_F$—when they evaluate a female candidate’s qualifications. Importantly, we do not need to assume that the selectorate has a worse view of women’s average qualifications for political office. We assume that valence is not

\(^{10}\)Sanbonmatsu (2006) finds that political elites in the U.S. believe there to be more uncertainty about female than male candidates. The selectorates within the parties are also more likely to be male, making women’s competence less known as quality that is signaled through homosocial ties (e.g., Niklasson, 2005; Bjarnegaard, 2009). These basic premises correspond to a huge literature in economics, sociology, and psychology.
related to gender and hence has the same normal distribution among men and women in the population (Mansbridge, 1999; Murray, 2014). The selectorate is aware of this and therefore expect men and women to be equally suitable for politics, so that \( \bar{V}_F = \bar{V}_M \).

With positive selection into politics, most of the candidates who are reviewed by the selectorate will have true qualifications that exceed the average of their respective gender. In this situation, Equation 1 implies that the average man will receive a better evaluation than the average woman, so that more men than women are (s)elected. The evaluation of women’s qualifications will be pulled down more by the group average than by the evaluation of male candidates. The selectorate relies on the group average as an information shortcut for women to a greater extent than for men because they are more ignorant about women’s true qualifications.

Our setup of the information asymmetry echoes supply and demand models where party recruiters are prejudiced against women and rely on information shortcuts, i.e., their own prejudice, to approximate the competence of female candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). In our case, we argue that women’s disadvantage stems from being evaluated based on the group average, whereas men are judged based on their individual characteristics. This information asymmetry yields a clear disadvantage for women, even in the absence of negatively biased views. Negative prejudice, direct or indirect, could be added to the model by setting \( \bar{V}_F < \bar{V}_M \) and would increase the disadvantage of women.\(^{11}\) This would make our deductions below even more stark, but it is not necessary for deriving them.

### 3.2 Signaling via Dynastic Ties

Next, we re-write Equation 1 to take account of dynastic ties in the selectorate’s evaluation of political candidates. For this purpose, we think of a candidate as “dynastic”

\(^{11}\)Although evidence is mixed, a considerable body of research shows that voters tend to have a negative view of female politicians (Anzia and Berry, 2011). A negative bias against women as candidates within parties, both by male politicians and party selectors, has also been identified in numerous studies (Niven, 1998; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015; Folke and Rickne, 2016; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012).
if he or she is related by blood or marriage to another politician currently or formerly holding political office. The important definitional constraint is that the relative preceded the candidate into office. In what follows, we develop the basic idea that the selectorate can draw on information already gained about the qualifications of an incumbent politician to infer the individual qualifications of the potential dynastic junior, i.e., the new candidate who is linked to the incumbent via family ties. This behavior—we will argue—helps women to overcome some of the disadvantages caused by asymmetric information regarding the true qualifications of candidates across genders.

The idea of inferred quality from dynastic seniors to dynastic juniors was recently proposed in the theoretical model of Besley and Reynal-Querol (2013). It also corresponds to the general idea that (more competent) predecessor(s) who have made better policy decisions, accumulated larger donor networks, financial capabilities, or channels to deliver public spending to a candidate’s district, create advantages in financial resources, brand name, etc., for future family members who aim for political office (e.g., Feinstein, 2010; Asako et al., 2015).

We denote the average qualifications for political office within a specific family as $\bar{V}_s$. This average can be thought of as the average of the selectorate’s previous evaluations of the dynastic seniors, and is hence derived from, but not an exact average of, the competence of the senior dynastic politician(s). Two things should be noted about the inferred competence of the dynastic seniors, $\bar{V}_s$. First, because of the positive selection into politics (Dal Bó et al., 2016), the average competence of these former politicians will lie above the perceived average competence of both men and women in the population, so that $\bar{V}_s > (\bar{V}_F = \bar{V}_M)$. Second, it is reasonable to assume that qualifications for political office, like education and human capital accumulation, are correlated across generations and within couples. There is hence a positive correlation between the individual’s true

\[12\text{An expanded model could allow the evaluation of the dynastic senior(s), } \bar{V}_s, \text{ to be positively related to their number of periods in elected office. This would correspond to the competence operationalization in previous work (e.g., Hirano and Snyder, 2014), as well the finding that a longer tenure facilitates the subsequent entry of dynastic juniors (e.g., Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Rossi, 2015; Querubin, 2016). Although this extension could deliver additional testable hypotheses, space constraints require that we leave it for future work.} \]
qualifications $V_i$ and the dynastic signal from that person’s dynastic seniors.

We can now re-write the selection equation (Equation 1) to include the dynastic signal and evaluate its role in overcoming the information asymmetry between men and women. Letting the parameter $D$ denote dynastic politicians, $D > 0$, versus non-dynastic politicians, $D = 0$, we write the extended evaluation equation as:

$$\hat{V}_i = (1 - I_g)V_i + D I_g \bar{V}_s + (1 - D)I_g \bar{V}_g.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The equation shows that for non-dynastic men and women, evaluations continue as previously expressed under Equation 1. However, dynastic candidates are evaluated less on the basis of the average qualifications of their sex by a factor $(1 - D)$, and this shortfall is replaced by the average competence of their dynastic seniors, by a factor $D$. In other words, being dynastic makes up for some of the ignorance about the candidate’s true competence.\footnote{The precise size of $D$ can be interpreted as the strength of dynastic information signal in a particular institutional context. For example, $D$ might vary under different electoral systems or party organizational types (Smith, 2012), or campaign finance frameworks. Variation in $D$ could also be derived from factors within a specific context, such as the time between the predecessor’s exit and the dynastic candidate’s entry; whether the dynastic candidate is running in a different district from his or her predecessor; the type of dynastic ties (widows, siblings, etc.). We leave hypotheses based on the size of $D$ to future research.}

What implications does Equation 2 have for the recruitment of women and men to politics? For women, whose true qualifications are less known, being dynastic increases the judged competence by a larger margin than for men. In other words, revealed information about the quality of the dynastic seniors helps women to overcome some of the information asymmetry vis-à-vis men.\footnote{Recent evidence from Argentina suggests that women do take advantage of their dynastic seniors as an information signal. Rossi (2015) finds that married female political candidates are 48 percent more likely to use their husband’s surname in their political campaign activities if it is recognizable than if it is not.} As a result, it will be easier for women with dynastic ties to enter the political arena than their non-dynastic counterparts, which results in a larger proportion of dynastic ties among elected women than among elected men.

Two points are worth noting about Equation 2. First, the larger the information
asymmetry between men and women ($I_F - I_M$) the larger the dynastic bias in gender representation. In other words, the less the selectorate knows about female politicians’ true qualifications, the more reliant it becomes on the quality of dynastic seniors and—in turn—the larger the advantage of those dynastic women relative to non-dynastic women.\footnote{This is shown mathematically in Online Appendix Section B, and we return to the discussion about the size of the information asymmetry in the section on gender quotas to follow.}

Hence, a declining information asymmetry over time could explain the reduction in the dynastic bias in the recruitment of women documented in the cross-country empirical record. A second point about Equation 2 is that being dynastic does not always give a net improvement in the evaluation of a candidate. If the dynastic senior(s) is of lower perceived quality than the population average within the candidate’s gender, the evaluation will worsen as dynastic ties are factored in.

We can now derive a simple hypothesis for the role of dynastic ties in the political recruitment of men and women. If our model is correct, and the selectorate relies more on the dynastic signal—the qualifications of the dynastic senior(s)—when they judge the qualifications of women compared to when they judge the qualifications of men, then:

**Hypothesis:** the selectorate’s evaluation of the qualifications of a dynastic senior has a stronger correlation with its evaluation of female dynastic junior(s) than with its evaluation of male dynastic junior(s).

### 4 Testing the Signaling Model in Two Country Cases

We test our hypothesis on candidate-level data from two countries, one with a candidate-centered electoral system (Ireland) and one with a party-centered system (Sweden). In Ireland, candidates are elected using the STV electoral system in multi-member districts that range in magnitude ($M$) from three to five seats. Voters rank the candidates in order of preference. If a candidate receives enough votes to surpass the electoral quota, he or she is elected and his or her surplus votes are re-distributed to the next-preference candidate on each of the surplus ballots. The electoral quota (also known as the Droop
quota, and not to be confused with the gender quota we will discuss later for the case of Sweden) is defined as \( \frac{\text{Total votes cast}}{M+1} + 1 \). If no candidate’s preference votes reach the quota amount, then the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated and his or her votes are re-distributed to the next-preference candidate on each voter’s ballot. This process continues until all seats are filled. In Sweden, candidates are selected from multi-member districts using semi-open list proportional representation. Voters may cast a preference vote for a single candidate on their chosen party ballot, though in practice these votes rarely alter the ballot ranks determined by parties prior to the election.\(^{16}\) In what follows, we present the tests for each country separately.

### 4.1 Ireland

Our data for Ireland include all candidates in national parliamentary (Dáil) elections held between 1918 and 2016. The coding of dynastic ties is based on verified information from yearly political almanacs, biographical dictionaries, and newspaper reports. In cases where official biographical sources are lacking, census records and other sources were consulted.\(^{17}\) We use the same definition of “dynastic” as for the comparative data (i.e., a relation to a national-level elected politician). Besides information about dynastic ties, our Irish data also include the level of education for elected candidates.\(^{18}\)

In our empirical analysis, we restrict the sample to the post-1944 period. We also restrict the sample to the three main parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour), as they have consistently nominated candidates across districts and time, accounting for

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\(^{16}\)Closed lists were used prior to 1998. In the semi-open list system used since 1998, a candidate must receive a number of preference votes equivalent to 5% of the party vote in order to be catapulted to the top of the ranking. Because this threshold is quite high, more than 99% of the elected politicians who pass the threshold would have been elected anyway thanks to their (already high) list rank. See Folke, Persson and Rickne (2016) for a thorough discussion.

\(^{17}\)Such a case might result if the dynastic successor failed to get elected, and thus lacked any official biography. Many of these cases were nonetheless successfully identified based on newspaper reports and census records.

\(^{18}\)We lack educational data on 93 (out of 784) candidates, corresponding to 229 of 2,964 observations. These are predominately non-dynastic male candidates who served few terms, all prior to 1970, and most likely had no more than a secondary education. We are missing educational data for one dynastic woman and four dynastic men.
roughly 60 percent of the total number of candidates. The final sample includes 5,618 candidates. Given Ireland’s candidate-centered system, we focus on the role of voters in the selection of dynastic men and women. We measure voters’ evaluation of a candidate (the left-hand side of Equation 1) as the candidate’s share of the electoral quota obtained with first-preference votes.

The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we test whether being a dynastic junior is associated with a larger vote advantage among women than among men. Second, we test if this larger advantage can be traced to high-quality dynastic seniors in particular. In the first step, we use a straightforward OLS regression to compare the share of the electoral quota obtained by dynastic and non-dynastic men and women (with first-preference votes). A dummy variable for being a woman is interacted with a dummy variable for dynastic status, the goal of which is to evaluate whether the share of the electoral quota gets a bigger boost from the dynastic relationship for women than for men. Specification (1) pools all candidates across all years. Specification (2) includes party-year fixed effects and specification (3) adds district-year fixed effects.

The results in Table 1 show that being a member of a political dynasty is decidedly an advantage, and that the effect is more important for women than for men. The latter is indicated by the positive and statistically significant estimate on the interaction term between gender and dynastic status (Woman * Dynasty). For women, being a member of a dynasty appears to “erase” part of the disadvantage faced by female candidates more generally. Interestingly, when we add district-year fixed effects in specification (3), the size of the estimate on the interaction term between female gender and dynastic status is only slightly reduced. This indicates that the vote advantage of dynastic women is indeed driven by the voters, and not (mainly) by parties placing them in districts where the party gets more votes on average.

We now proceed to testing whether the (larger) advantage that dynastic women hold over non-dynastic women can be attributed to having a high-quality dynastic senior. In contrast, the quality of the senior should be less important in the evaluation of male
Table 1: OLS estimates of the relationship between sex, dynastic status, and share of the electoral quota in Ireland.

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<thead>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.165***</td>
<td>-0.174***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0148)</td>
<td>(0.0148)</td>
<td>(0.0172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>0.176***</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
<td>0.189***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman*Dynasty</td>
<td>0.0852***</td>
<td>0.0681**</td>
<td>0.0513*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0266)</td>
<td>(0.0265)</td>
<td>(0.0293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,615</td>
<td>5,615</td>
<td>5,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District-year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is a candidate’s share of the electoral (Droop) quota obtained with first-preference votes. Sample restricted to candidates of the main parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The number of observations is smaller than the total sample (N = 5,618) because three candidates were returned unopposed.

juniors. To test this hypothesis, we restrict the sample to cases of immediate dynastic successions (i.e., two family members running back-to-back in successive elections in the same district). This sample restriction is intended to limit any “noise” that might enter into selection and election decisions when a dynastic junior runs many elections after his or her senior predecessor, or in a different district. The evaluation of the dynastic senior, and that of the dynastic junior, are both measured by the politician’s quota share—for seniors, we average the quota share over all elections; for juniors, we focus on the quota share in the candidate’s first election after succession.

Figure 2 plots the relationship between the selectorate’s evaluation of the dynastic senior and that of the dynastic junior, splitting the sample by sex of the junior. As predicted, the plot shows a stronger positive relationship for women than for men. In comparing the slope coefficient (Online Appendix Table C.1), the relationship is nearly three times as strong for the female dynastic juniors than for the males (0.951 compared to 0.3). It indeed appears that dynastic women are evaluated more based upon the electoral
Figure 2: Relationship between the share of the electoral quota obtained by dynastic seniors (x-axis) and dynastic juniors (y-axis), by gender of the junior.
Note: The sample is restricted to cases of immediate dynastic succession (N = 77 male successors, 24 female successors).
quality of their predecessors than dynastic men. In other words, women appear more
dependent on the dynastic signal than men, which is consistent with weaker information
about their true qualifications.

4.2 Sweden

The Swedish data come from the whole universe of politicians in 290 municipal councils,
17 county elections, and the national parliament. It covers nine elections over a 30-
year period (1982-2010). Our analytical focus is on the municipal councils, which hold
substantial political power and offer a large sample size for testing our model. Each
council has between 31-101 elected politicians and local political parties make autonomous
decisions on their political nominations.

A complete record of every politician’s personal ID code allows us to anonymously
match each person to his or her 1) siblings, 2) parents, and 3) spouse, using highly
accurate register data. We can thus define a dynastic politician as a person with a close
family member who held political office at the local, county, or national level before they
themselves were elected. While our measurement of family ties is extremely accurate, it
suffers from a time truncation because we can only verify politicians as dynastic if they
had a relative in office in 1982 or thereafter. The most accurate measurement of dynastic
politicians will thus exist in the more recent election(s) in the sample, but the truncation
will be less important when we compare dynastic men and women at any given point in
time. The Swedish data also contain detailed background variables from administrative
records for every person in the data set, most importantly the person’s education level
and, for the men, evaluations of IQ and leadership abilities from the Swedish military
enlistment process (further discussed below).

Since Sweden was not among the twelve democracies in the comparative data, we begin
by establishing that 1) there is a smaller proportion of women than men in elected office,
but that 2) dynastic politicians account for a larger fraction of the elected women than the
elected men. Both of these conditions are shown in Figure 3, which draws on data from
all elected municipal councilors from 1998-2010. We exclude the five earliest elections from the empirical tests to sidestep the influence of measurement error in dynastic status from the time truncation issue.

The next step of the analysis is to assess if the quality of a dynastic senior matters more in the selectorate’s evaluation of female politicians than it does for male politicians. In other words, we will again test our theoretical hypothesis. The municipal party organization is the main selectorate. Each local party implements its own procedure for ranking candidates on the ordered ballot, usually with internal nominations by party clubs within the municipality (in parties on the left of the ideological spectrum), or by internal primaries (in the center-right parties).

We use two approaches to measure the quality of the dynastic senior in the Swedish case. These two approaches are complementary in the sense that each addresses a relative weakness in the other. First, we use the highest rank-order on the electoral ballot achieved by each politician during his or her political career. This measure captures the party’s evaluation of the person’s suitability for top posts, since the rank-order on the ballot approximates the internal power structure within the party (e.g., Folke and Rickne, 2016; Folke, Persson and Rickne, 2016). The higher (lower numerically in terms of list position)
that a candidate has reached, the more favorable he or she has been viewed by the party. However, using the position in the party hierarchy to measure the evaluation of a politician comes with a drawback that power and influence could have an independent effect on the evaluation of a politician’s dynastic junior. If there is a gender difference in this potential impact, we risk confounding our measurement of the selectorate’s evaluation with the politician’s power.

The second (set of) measures capture the dynastic senior’s individual qualifications in terms of education and personal traits, each of which has previously been shown to predict internal success within a party (see Dal Bó et al., 2016). When using these measures, we can hold list rank constant, controlling for the political power of the senior. The first qualification measure is years of education, the most common proxy for qualifications in empirical political science, argued to broadly capture enhanced practical skills, signaling ability, and civic engagement (e.g., Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). The second and third measures come from Sweden’s military enlistment register and capture scores of the recruits’ 1) cognitive ability and 2) leadership skills. The cognitive score is similar to the armed forces qualifying tests (AFQT) in the United States and is commonly perceived as a good measure of general intelligence (Carlstedt, 2000). The leadership score is based on an interview with a certified psychologist, aimed at capturing a conscript’s psychological capacity to deal with military duty and armed combat, principally his ability to cope with stress and to contribute to group cohesion. A conscript obtains a high score if he is considered to be emotionally stable, persistent, socially outgoing, willing to assume responsibility, and able to take initiatives. Operationally, both scores are measured on a discrete 1-9 scale that is approximately normally distributed with a mean of 5. For Swedish men born between 1952-1980, military enlistment was mandatory and non-compliance punished by jail time. The vast majority of each male cohort enlisted and had large incentives to perform well on the tests.19

19 A third possible approach to measuring the quality of the dynastic senior could have been to use their tallies of preference votes, similar to our measure for the Ireland case. However, since semi-open lists were first introduced in 1998, we lack this information for most seniors in our data.
We test our hypothesis by relating the quality of the (potential) dynastic senior to the probability of having a female dynastic junior or—in a separate regression—a male dynastic junior. This means that we capture the evaluation of the selectorate, $\hat{V}_i$, with a dummy of whether a dynastic junior was elected to a municipal assembly sometime after the senior politician served. The regression equation is

$$Y_i = \alpha_m + \alpha_t + \alpha_p + \beta C_i + \epsilon_{it},$$

(3)

where $Y_i$ is a binary indicator of whether a relative or spouse of the politician (the dynastic junior) enters into a local council at any point in time after the senior’s own first term in office. Politicians who married their dynastic senior at any point after being nominated for political office are not included in this definition.\(^{20}\) The estimate of interest, $\beta$, captures the relationship between the qualifications of the senior politician, $C_i$, and the event of having a junior of each specific gender. The vectors of intercepts $\alpha_m, \alpha_t,$ and $\alpha_p$ are fixed effects for municipality ($m$), election period ($t$), and political party ($p$).

We estimate three specifications of Equation 3 and report the results in Table 2. The first specification for each gender (columns 1 and 4) includes only the senior’s qualifications, $C$, and the fixed effects. In columns 2 and 5, we add controls for a large set of individual control variables for the dynastic senior.\(^{21}\) In columns 3 and 6, we add fixed effects for the senior’s highest list rank during his career. This third specification is an attempt to control for the political power of the senior (but note that we could also expect a positive correlation between quality and power, so the estimate on quality will likely have a downward bias after including this control).

The results for each of the four quality measures are contained in a separate panel in Table 2, starting with list rank, followed by years of education, the cognitive score, and

\(^{20}\)Including these politicians makes the results stronger, likely because competent politicians are more likely to attract a spouse on the internal marriage market of the local party.

\(^{21}\)These include five age categories, and binary indicators for being born in a foreign country and for having at least one foreign-born parent, and fixed effects for the interaction for the first election year of the politician and election period.
Table 2: OLS estimates of the relationship between the qualifications of the dynastic senior and the event of having a male dynastic follower (left) or a female dynastic follower (right).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Junior</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female Junior</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average probability</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Average probability</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Rank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>23,667</td>
<td>23,667</td>
<td>23,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>23,327</td>
<td>23,327</td>
<td>23,325</td>
<td>23,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Score</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,927</td>
<td>5,927</td>
<td>5,926</td>
<td>5,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Score</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
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<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>4,954</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>4,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Controls</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Rank FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual politician are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include fixed effects for election year. Control variables include five age categories (30-49 = reference), and binary indicators for being foreign born and for having at least one foreign-born parent, and fixed effects for the interaction for the first election year of the politician and election period.
finally the leadership score. Each provides support for our hypothesis. First, there is a strong negative correlation between list rank (the lower the value the higher the rank) and the probability of having a female follower, but not for having a male follower. Moving up one position on the ballot is associated with a one percentage point (1.5 percent in relative terms) higher probability of having a dynastic female follower. Similarly, for all three competence measures we find a positive and statistically significant relationship with the event of having a female follower, but not with having a male follower. The estimates on the competence measures are barely affected when we control for the senior’s list rank, suggesting that our main finding is not driven by the political power of the senior.

4.3 Summary

The findings in both of our case studies teach us something new about how a political selectorate evaluates male and female dynastic candidates for political office. For candidate groups who are newcomers to the political system, in this case women, the quality of a dynastic predecessor is used as an information shortcut. For groups whom the selectorate is accustomed to evaluating and therefore has better information about, in this case men, this information shortcut is not as important (as in the Irish case), or not important at all (as in the Swedish case). The effect appears to exist regardless of the type of selectorate. The Irish results illustrate this process for voter evaluations and the Swedish results for evaluations made by party elites.

5 Dynastic Recruitment and Politician Quality

What can our theory say about the relationship between dynastic recruitment and meritocracy in politics? This question holds relevance for academic discussions about substantive representation, because women’s qualifications can be viewed as a proxy for the types of policy decisions that will be effected by them once in office. It also holds relevance for the common view that dynastic recruitment undercuts politician quality and threatens
the legitimacy of democratic elections (Geys, 2016). Dynasticism is sometimes viewed as a sign of corruption, at worst, and a channel to bring mediocre women into politics, at best. The gender-specific term “proxy women” is sometimes used to denote the types of women who male elites recruit into politics as placeholders or to help consolidate or protect their own positions of power.\textsuperscript{22} Such female proxies are expected to have low levels of formal qualifications, making them easy to control (Ban and Rao, 2008; Jalalzai, 2013).

Our framework can be used to directly examine this issue and derive predictions about the difference between dynastic women and dynastic men, as well that between dynastic and non-dynastic politicians within each gender. To do this, we will take a step back to the selection equation (Equation 1) and derive the relationship between individual qualifications \( V_i \), and the selectorate’s evaluation of qualifications \( \hat{V}_i \). In Figure 4, we plot this relationship for dynastic women and men as well as for non-dynastic women and men. Drawing the plot requires us to assume that a dynastic junior’s qualifications \( V_i \) are equal to the evaluation of the dynastic senior’s qualifications \( \bar{V}_s \).\textsuperscript{23} In Online Appendix Section B, we provide the exact derivations of the slope coefficient for each group. In the figure, we also show an artificial level of individual qualifications, \( \hat{V}_{\text{cut}} \), above which we assume that the selectorate’s evaluation is sufficiently high to elect the politician. This bar is higher than the average competence of each gender, \( \bar{V}_g \), due to positive selection into politics.

The figure illustrates a key prediction of the model, which is that dynastic women have to be more qualified than dynastic men to win office. This is because the dynastic tie can only help them to close a portion of the gender gap in the information asymmetry

\textsuperscript{22}This phenomenon could be seen as related to the theories about elite persistence in democratic systems. Once in power, members of the political elite strategize to maintain their positions. Power may be reproduced by recruiting people from within the elite’s own social circles, for example via family bonds or friendships (Michels, 1915; Munk Christiansen, Møller and Togeby, 2001). It is also related to the work on “tokenism” in organizations, where tokens are members of a minority group that can be controlled by the majority. A (male) member of the elite that controls replacements (into the elite) may lift women into power in a formal sense, but use their loyalties to ensure that they are not given substantive power (e.g., Kanter, 1977).

\textsuperscript{23}As long as there is positive selection into politics this assumption is not necessary for any of our predictions to hold. We discuss and show this in Online Appendix Section B.
Dynastic women
Dynastic men
Non-dynastic women
Non-dynastic men

Figure 4: Relationship between individual qualifications $V_i$, and the selectorate’s evaluation of qualifications $\hat{V}_i$. 
with regard to their own qualifications. This prediction is central in contradicting the idea of proxy women as a main reason behind the dynastic bias across genders in political representation. In our graphical illustration, dynastic women also need to be more qualified than non-dynastic men. However, as we show in Online Appendix Section B, whether or not this is the case will depend on the size of women’s relative information disadvantage, \( \frac{I_f - I_m}{I_f} \), relative to the size of the strength of the dynastic signal, \( D \).

As illustrated by Figure 4, the model can also be used to derive predictions regarding the qualifications of the dynastic politicians in comparison to their non-dynastic counterparts. It is clear that both dynastic women and dynastic men will need lower individual qualifications to get elected. The intuition behind this is simply that the evaluation of both dynastic men and women will be improved via the quality signal from their senior(s), which allows them to get elected with lower qualifications on average.

The only qualification measure that is available to us for both genders and in both country cases is years of education, which we estimate based on information about the highest degree earned. We first give the results for Ireland, where we plot the average years of education by decade in Figure 5. The time dimension is included to help visualize the strong trends in the level of education among both men and women. The figure shows that dynastic women have had higher average levels of education than non-dynastic men over the entire time period. In the last four decades, they have even had the highest level of qualifications of all four groups. This finding contradicts the idea that dynastic women are low-educated proxies, but only the latter half of the sample agrees with our predictions that dynastic women should be more qualified than dynastic men. Another discrepancy is that dynastic women appear more qualified than the non-dynastic women, a pattern that we also observe among men.

The rising trend in the education-related qualifications of dynastic women is most likely due to the fact that the composition of family ties has shifted over time. Prior to 1977, a majority of dynastic women were the widows of deceased male legislators, much like the “widow’s succession” phenomenon observed in the United States (Werner,
Figure 5: Average education level by decade, sex and dynasticism among Irish parliamentarians.

Note: Years of education estimated based on highest degree earned: 6 years (primary), 12 years (secondary), 14 (some third-level), 16 years (BA or equivalent), 18 years (MA), 20 years (PhD).
Since 1977, a majority of dynastic women have been daughters or nieces (see Online Appendix Figure C.2). In the general population, it wasn’t until the cohort of men and women born between 1957-1961 that near gender parity in third-level education was attained (based on data in the 1991 census). Hence, a gendered age effect could account for the pattern in the figure.

For Sweden, we plot the average number of years of education of the politicians in our estimation sample, i.e. the four most recent elections (Figure 6). As in the Irish case, we see that dynastic women are more qualified than dynastic men. Dynastic women have 0.5 years more education on average, a difference in means that is significant at the 1

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24 Only one wife, Áine Brady, was not a widow; however, she was also a fifth-generation dynastic politician whose father and two brothers had served before her husband.
percent level. Dynastic women are especially over-represented among those with at least 17 years of education (i.e., having finished a university degree). As in the Irish case, we do not find support for the prediction that dynastic politicians are less qualified within each gender. Both dynastic men and dynastic women have slightly more education (0.2 years on average) than their non-dynastic counterparts.

In sum, the empirical data provide clear support for the prediction that dynastic women are more qualified than dynastic men, which means that the dynastic gender bias in the recruitment of women should not undercut the overall competence of elected politicians. At the same time, we do not find support for the prediction that dynastic politicians in general are less qualified than non-dynastic politicians. This is, again, good news for the impact of dynasticism on meritocracy, but does not conform to the expectations of our theoretical model. We note that this pattern strongly contradicts the idea of dynastic women as being recruited as proxies, but are forced to leave an investigation into the exact mechanism for future studies.\(^\text{25}\)

\section{Gender Quotas and Dynastic Recruitment}

Finally, in this section, we examine the implications of our model for the impact of a gender quota on the dynastic recruitment of women. A point of departure for this discussion is the information asymmetry in the selectorate’s evaluation of men and women as candidates. As discussed in the theory section and shown formally in Online Appendix Section B, the larger the information asymmetry, the larger the relative reliance on dynastic ties in the recruitment of women.

It is a basic fact that quotas are introduced in organizations where women’s initial presence is relatively low, i.e., where there is a perceived need to increase women’s descriptive representation. From the intuition of our model, we can also deduce that the fewer the women, the greater the information asymmetry across genders, and hence a larger

\(^{25}\)It could be, for example, that other measures of quality (aside from years of education) might yield different results.
reliance on the dynastic signal to fill the female-reserved seats that open up through the quota. We expect that, in the short run, a gender quota will lead to an increase in the probability that a recruited woman is dynastic. Notably, the quota should be unrelated to the probability that a recruited man is dynastic, because the information about men’s true qualifications was already known prior to the introduction of the quota and does not change with the reform. Because women’s entry through the quota results in them having a presence in the organization, and thus building information about their true qualifications, we expect the dynastic bias in gender recruitment to decrease in the long run following the imposition of the quota.

We test our hypothesis using the same identification strategy as in O’Brien and Rickne (2016), which exploits the fact that Sweden’s largest political party, SAP, introduced a zipper quota in the 1994 local elections. This quota mandated local parties to alternate male and female names on their ballot, leading to near-equity because the electoral system is such that seats are counted from the top of the ballot. The smaller the proportion of elected women prior to the quota, the larger the forced increase. The average local party increased its proportion of elected women by 10 percentage points (see Online Appendix Figure C.3). As the quota was imposed by the central party organization, whose hand was forced by an outside group that threatened to start a feminist political party, it created an exogenous shock to the local parties’ recruitment practices.

We use a difference-in-difference specification that isolates the exogenous quota shock, restricting the data sample to the new (first-term) politicians in each election (1988-2010). The regression specification is estimated at the level of the individual, and takes the form

\[
Dyn_i = \alpha + \beta_t \Delta w_{1994-1991,m} \ast Election_t + \gamma_t Election_t + \theta_m Mun_m, \tag{4}
\]

where the outcome variable \(Dyn_i\) is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the newly recruited politician was dynastic, and 0 if the person was not dynastic. The treatment

\[26\] See O’Brien and Rickne (2016) for a detailed explanation of the zippered ballot.
is denoted $\Delta w_{1994-1991,m}$ and measures the change in the proportion of elected women in the local SAP in municipality $m$ between the years 1991 and 1994. To estimate the effect of the quota, the impact measure is interacted with a dummy variable for each election between 1988 and 2010: $Election_t$. The 1991 election is used as the reference category. This means that the key vector of estimates $\beta_t$ capture the difference in the probability that a newly elected politician is dynastic in the election year in question, for example in 1994 (the first year with the quota) compared to the reference year, 1991.

Figure 7 displays the estimates of $\beta_t$ graphically (a table of estimates can also be found in Online Appendix Table C.2). To make the estimates more easily interpretable, we scale the quota impact variable so that the estimate is interpreted as the change in the probability that a politician is dynastic if the party was forced to increase the proportion of elected women by ten percentage points, which is corresponds to the average of the variable across all 290 municipalities.

The plotted estimates and confidence intervals in Figure 7 suggest that the quota increased the recruitment of dynastic women. The solid maroon dots for the elections in 1994 and 1998 indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of women, brought on by the quota, increased the probability that each recruited woman was dynastic by about 3 percentage points (but note that the 1994 estimate is just barely below significance level of 5 percent). For men (point estimates and confidence intervals represented with hollow navy dots), there is no corresponding change, in neither a positive nor negative direction, in dynastic recruitment.

The estimates for the latter election periods show that the impact of the quota on the recruitment of dynastic women was temporary. The estimates for the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections are close to zero and have large standard errors. A temporary impact of the quota is an interesting empirical observation, but one that we cannot account for with our static model. It is, however, consistent with the spirit of our theory, in that the quota brings in more women as politicians, which should decrease the information asymmetry facing female candidates in the longer run. We relegate an in-depth discussion
Figure 7: Impact of the quota-induced change in the proportion of elected women relative to the base year (1991) on the probability that a newly elected municipal councilor is dynastic, by sex and election year.
and potential explanations of this finding to future studies.

7 Discussion and Conclusions

Across many democracies, a dynastic relationship to a previous politician is a dramatically more prominent channel of recruitment into office for women than for men. In this study, we have provided comparative evidence across thirteen countries that women’s recruitment is often characterized by this dynastic bias. Our theory to explain this pattern offers the novel hypothesis that socioeconomic groups who are newcomers in the political arena—such as women—are more reliant on signaling their qualifications via dynastic seniors who are already insiders. One way of understanding this claim is that selectorates, both voters and parties, want to avoid the risk associated with an unknown candidate and use shortcuts to impute missing information. Our model provides a new perspective on dynastic recruitment, offers an explanation for the gender difference in this recruitment channel, and also offers valuable predictions for the relationship between dynasticism and candidate quality, as well as for the impact of gender quotas.

We find clear empirical support for the signaling effect of dynastic ties in our empirical case studies of Ireland, a candidate-centered system, and Sweden, a party-centered system. Women’s overall lower electoral strength was found to be bridged by having dynastic seniors, which could be traced to an increased success of women with high-quality seniors. Illustrating the gender difference for the signaling channel, the same relationship between the quality of the dynastic senior and the electoral success of the junior was not found to be as prominent among men.

Future studies should continue to study dynastic recruitment as a way to further understand party and voter behavior. Our descriptive evidence shows that the female dynastic bias decreased over time in most democracies. According to the interpretation of our theoretical model, this change may be driven by a lower reliance on information shortcuts once the true qualifications of women become more known (Lawson and Lenz, 2011).
Further studies of this process could be expanded to investigate recruitment patterns for other political minorities and newcomers, such as young persons (who also appear to have a large dynastic bias), ethnic minorities, immigrants, openly LGBT politicians, etc.

Regarding candidate quality, our empirical investigations did not support the theoretical prediction that dynastic politicians are less qualified than non-dynastic politicians. We did find, however, that dynastic women were more qualified than men, both dynastic and non-dynastic, which is in line with our model but sharply contradicts the conjecture of dynastic women being relatively un-qualified and controllable “proxies.” Our finding that dynastic women are more qualified than non-dynastic women (with the exception of our findings for the education level of widows in early decades in Ireland) means that the bias toward dynasticism does not result in a net loss of qualifications among elected women as a whole. Dynastic ties help parties select more qualified women when high-quality seniors provide a signal of high-quality daughters, sisters, or wives.

Our findings regarding gender quotas can also be of interest to both academics and advocates of women’s political representation. Our results indicate that a gender quota is likely to lead to a disproportionate inflow of dynastic women, but only in the short term. Dynastic ties appear to play a role in the recruitment of women when parties are forced to raise women’s descriptive representation by affirmative action. This may be somewhat surprising in the Swedish case, given that the local SAP parties had an average proportion of elected women that already exceeded 30 percent before the quota, and strong women’s branches acting as a pipeline for female candidates. An inflow of dynastic women under these circumstances of a healthy supply of female candidates suggests that the same consequence would likely occur in other contexts.

As a summary comment on all of our findings, we raise the caveat that dynastic ties could have an asymmetric impact on the supply of politicians across genders. If a high-quality senior is more inspiring to his or her female relatives than to male relatives, possibly because of lower initial ambitions among women, this could be an omitted variable both in our theory and our empirics. Although we cannot fully dispel this alternative
explanation, we can clearly say that it is not operating in the Irish case. In that case, we established the gendered signaling effect among individuals who had already entered the system and become candidates for office, sidestepping an impact via the entry decision. Nevertheless, the potential impact of an active or passive role of dynastic seniors in shaping the ambitions of their relatives merits attention in future studies.

Another important way to extend our understanding of gender and dynastic recruitment could be through in-depth studies of countries with different political institutions, party practices of recruitment, and norms and traditions. In addition, although we have focused on how dynastic ties operate as a signaling device in the recruitment and election processes in advanced democracies, the process and patterns may differ in new or developing democracies. One interesting clue for these studies is the “generational shift” in the composition of family ties among dynastic women in our century-long Irish data panel, with its striking transition from wives to daughters over this period. Another interesting avenue for research is to explore the introduction of institutional reforms, such as quotas, term limits, or even new electoral systems, that force parties to shift their recruitment behavior, or—with an eye to the theoretical model presented here—reforms that change the ability of candidates to showcase their true qualifications to voters.

Finally, although our findings indicate that the recruitment and promotion of dynastic women does not produce weaker average qualifications or levels of experience among politicians—neither at higher nor lower levels of political office—there is still a cause for concern. Our results paint a picture of a political recruitment process where women need compensating resources to pave the way to political power. Even with these resources, pathways are still not equal. We should therefore view gender differences in the recruitment and promotion of dynastic politicians as an important symptom of a much larger problem in the political system.
References


A Supporting information: data

A.1 Cross-country MP-level data

The following lists the data range and primary sources of the cross-country MP-level data. In cases of uncertainty, Wikipedia biographies and the personal webpages of individual MPs were also consulted in addition to the primary sources. For some country cases, MP observations commence with the first parliament session. For other country cases, observations are limited to post-World War II parliaments. However, any dynastic ties to pre-1945 politicians are coded, as are ties to politicians in proto-parliaments and pre-independence parliaments.

In the analysis in the main text, we use only the post-1945 data. Junior MPs are those who have family members who served in parliament (either chamber in the case of bicameral systems), the cabinet or presidency, or proto-parliaments, and served prior to the MP’s own service. Relationships to local-level politicians are not included. By-election winners are included, grouped with the previous general election.

Australia

Time Period:
1901 (1st House of Representatives) to 2013 (44th House of Representatives); 44 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) ParlInfo Archive (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/).

Canada

Time Period:
1867 (1st House of Commons) to 2011 (41st House of Commons); 41 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) ParlInfo Archive (www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/).

Finland

Time Period:
1907 (1st Eduskunta) to 2011 (36th Eduskunta); 36 sessions.

Data Sources:
Special Notes:
MPs whose relatives served in the Privy Council or Diet of the Grand Duchy prior to Finnish independence are coded as junior.

Iceland

Time Period:
1949 (1st postwar Althingi) to 2013 (20th postwar Althingi); 20 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Althingi (http://www.althingi.is).

Ireland

Time Period:
1918 (1st Dáil) to 2016 (32nd Dáil); 32 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) Elections Ireland (http://electionsireland.org).
(2) Houses of the Oireachtas Archive biographies (http://www.oireachtas.ie).
(8) Irish Election Literature (http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com).

Israel

Time Period:
1949 (1st Knesset) to 2015 (20th Knesset); 20 sessions.

Data Sources:

Italy

Time Period:
1946 (Constituent Assembly) to 2013 (17th Legislature); 18 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Chamber of Deputies (dati.camera.it).

Special Notes:
MPs whose relatives served during the Kingdom of Italy (Regno d’Italia), in the National Council (Consulta Nazionale), or in the Senate are coded as junior.

Japan

Time Period:
1947 (23rd House of Representatives) to 2014 (47th House of Representatives); 25 sessions.

Data Sources:
Reed-Smith Japanese House of Representatives Elections Dataset (JHRED).

New Zealand

Time Period:
1853 (1st House of Representatives) to 2014 (51st House of Representatives); 51 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) New Zealand parliament library data archives (http://www.parliament.nz/).
(2) Encyclopedia of New Zealand (http://www.teara.govt.nz/).
(3) New Zealand History (http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/).
(4) Geni.com (http://www.geni.com/).

Norway

Time Period:
1945 (142nd Storting) to 2013 (160th Storting); 18 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) Storting Archive of Biographies (www.stortinget.no).
(2) Norwegian Social Science Data (NSD) Archive (http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/storting/).

Switzerland

Time Period:
1848 (1st Federal Assembly) to 2011 (49th Federal Assembly); 49 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) Swiss Parliament Archives (http://www.parlament.ch/e/suche/Pages/ratsmitglieder.aspx).

Special Notes:
The Swiss Federal Assembly has two chambers: the National Council (lower chamber) and the Council of States (upper chamber). Like the U.S. Congress, seats in the lower chamber are distributed in proportion to cantonal population in the lower chamber. In the upper chamber, each canton is represented by two members, with some exceptions. The executive is called the Federal Council.

United States

Time Period:
1788 (1st Congress) to 2014 (114th Congress); 114 sessions.

Data Sources:
(1) ICPSR Study #7803.
(2) Replication data for Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009)
(3) Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
Special Notes:
Individuals whose relatives served in the Continental Congress or in the presidency or vice presidency are coded as junior. Senate terms are divided into two-year periods to overlap with House terms.

Figure A.1: The dynastic bias in gender representation for elected MPs across twelve democracies, 1945-2016.

Note: The dynastic bias is measured as $\left( \frac{\text{Number of dynastic women}}{\text{Number of all women}} \right) - \left( \frac{\text{Number of dynastic men}}{\text{Number of all men}} \right)$.

A.2 Candidate-level data: Ireland

The complete candidate-level data for Ireland contain 11,670 observations on 4,716 individuals across 32 general elections and 131 by-elections held between 1918-2016. For our analysis, we focus on the candidates and MPs from 1944-2016. The primary sources of the data on candidates, their parties, and votes, are Elections Ireland (electionsire-

Information on the dynastic family ties of candidates and education level of elected MPs was carefully compiled from multiple sources, including Elections Ireland, the Dictionary of Irish Biography (dib.cambridge.org), various editions of almanacs such as the Nealon’s Guide, Magill Book, and Thom’s Commercial Directory, Irish Election Literature (http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com), newspaper reports, candidate websites, and census records.

A.3 Candidate-level data: Sweden

The Swedish dataset is a combination of data from three types of sources. The first is a list of all elected and non-elected individual candidates that ran for political office in either the national parliament, a county assembly, or a municipal assembly during the period of 1982-2010. Political parties must report their ordered ballots to the electoral agency, listing also the personal identification code of every politician. These lists are kept by Statistics Sweden and digitized by the authors for the earlier elections. Besides the political party and municipality or county where the list was on the ballot, we also know the list rank of every candidate. After the election, Statistics Sweden collects a record of all elected politicians for every party, and after 1998, the number of preference votes are also recorded.

The database of politicians is matched with variables from Sweden’s administrative records using the personal identification code. This matching is done by Statistics Sweden and is subject to a process of ethics and judicial clearance. The matching is based on the unique and mandatory personal identification code, which is the basis for all public record-keeping. In the final dataset used by the authors, these codes have been anonymized, and the dataset can only be accessed via the secure server of Statistics Sweden.

Family ties are taken from two registers. The Multigenerational Register contains all
links between the personal identification codes of parents and children, which also lets us identify all siblings. These links are recorded at birth by Sweden’s public health system. The marriage register contains links between the personal identification codes of present and previous marriages for every person who has entered such a union.

The full list of politicians, blood relatives of politicians, and spouses of politicians, are linked to their administrative records for the full time period (30 annual observations for each person). These records come from two main sources. Basic socioeconomic variables like gender, age, income, and education are taken from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labor market studies (known as LISA by its Swedish acronym). This database contains annual observations for our full time period (1982-2010). For example, income is recorded by the Tax Agency based on annual tax records, and all educational institutions report on completed educational programs and/or courses on an annual basis. As explained in more detail in the main text, the second source of information is time-invariant measures of cognitive and leadership abilities recorded by the Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency’s database.
B Supporting information: theoretical model

To show that the dynastic signal is more important for women, we start by taking the derivative of Equation 3 with respect to the strength of the dynastic signal, $D$, which is

$$\frac{\partial \hat{V}_i}{\partial D} = I_g (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_g)$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.1)

This shows that for each gender, the impact of being dynastic on the valuation of an individual’s qualifications depends on the size of the ignorance parameter, $I_g$. The larger the ignorance, the more important the signal. We can also write out this equation for the two genders to spell out the derivative for the information asymmetry ($I_f - I_m$) in the difference in men’s and women’s qualification evaluation,

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{V}_f - \hat{V}_m)}{\partial D} = I_f (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_f) - I_m (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_m)$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.2)

and assuming, for simplicity, that the two genders have the same average qualifications, denoted $\bar{V}_{all}$, this equation simplifies to:

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{V}_f - \hat{V}_m)}{\partial D} = I_f (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_{all}) - I_m (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_{all})$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.3)

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{V}_f - \hat{V}_m)}{\partial D} = (I_f - I_m) (\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_{all})$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.4)

This means that the cross derivative between Equation B.4 and the asymmetry parameter, $\frac{\partial (\hat{V}_f - \hat{V}_m)}{\partial D \partial (I_f - I_m)}$ will be $(\bar{V}_D - \bar{V}_{all})$. This is a positive value, because the perceived average qualifications of the dynastic seniors, $\bar{V}_D$, is an evaluation based on elected politicians, and positive selection into politics means that only the politicians with the highest evaluations will be elected (so the qualifications of the dynastic seniors will have higher qualifications than the population average). In turn, we can see that the larger the asymmetry parameter, the more important dynastic ties will be in closing the gap in gap in
qualification evaluations between men and women.
C Supporting information: empirical analyses

C.1 Dynastic signaling analysis

Table C.1: OLS estimates of the relationship between predecessor’s vote support and vote support of male and female dynastic followers in Ireland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(male junior)</td>
<td>0.300***</td>
<td>0.951***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female junior)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior’s average share of quota</td>
<td>0.300***</td>
<td>0.951***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is a candidate’s share of the electoral (Droop) quota obtained with first-preference votes in first election attempt. Sample restricted to candidates of the main parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour) who directly succeeded a family member. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

C.2 Qualifications analysis

First, we will formally show the slope coefficients for the relationships between individual quality and perceived quality. Replacing the quality of the senior with individual quality gives us the following functions for each of our four groups:

- Dynastic men: \( \hat{V}_i = V_i (1 - I_m (D - 1)) + (1 - D) I_m \* \bar{V}_m \)
- Non-dynastic men: \( \hat{V}_i = V_i (1 - I_m) + I_m \* \bar{V}_m \)
- Dynastic women: \( \hat{V}_i = V_i (1 - I_f (D - 1)) + (1 - D) I_f \* \bar{V}_f \)
- Non-dynastic women: \( \hat{V}_i = V_i (1 - I_f) + I_f \* \bar{V}_f \)

From these basic equations, it is easy to see that for a given qualification level, a dynastic man will be evaluated as more qualified than a dynastic women as long as the ignorance parameter, \( I_g \), is larger for women than for men. In a similar vein, it is easy to see that
dynastic men and women will be evaluated as more qualified for a given level of individual qualifications as long as the quality of the senior is used to evaluate an individual (i.e., $D$ is not zero)

Comparing the evaluation of dynastic women to non-dynastic men is slightly more complicated. Which group is advantaged will depend on the values of the parameters of the model. We can derive the condition for dynastic women being advantaged by simply stating the condition for the slope coefficient for dynastic women will be larger than for dynastic men.

\[
\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial V_i} (1 - I_f(D - 1)) + (1 - D) I_f \ast \nabla_f \] \[
= \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial V_i} (1 - I_m) + I_m \ast \nabla_m \] \[(C.1)\]

\[
1 + I_f(D - 1) > 1 - I_m \] \[(C.2)\]

\[
D - I_f > -I_m \] \[(C.3)\]

\[
D > \frac{I_f - I_m}{I_f} \] \[(C.4)\]

The condition for dynastic women having an advantage over dynastic men shows that this will take place when the strength of the dynastic signal, $D$, is large in relation to the relative information asymmetry between women and men, $\frac{I_f - I_m}{I_f}$.

Next, we will show that the main predictions are not sensitive to the assumption that the quality of the senior is not equal to the quality of the junior. To show that this is the case, we will turn to the extreme situation in which the quality of the senior is uncorrelated with that of the junior (naturally, in this case it would be irrational for the selectorate to use the signal to impute qualifications). In this case, the dynastic signal will lead to a shift in the relationship between perceived competence and actual competence. As long as there is positive selection into politics (i.e., the competence of politicians is above the population average), this shift will be positive.

In Figure C.1, we illustrate how the relationship between competence and perceived competence will appear for a given level of quality for the dynastic senior. The figure shows that we will get the exact same predictions as in the case where the qualifications
of the politician are equal to that of the dynastic seniors. The qualifications still need to be larger for dynastic women than for dynastic men. For both dynastic men and dynastic women, the qualification requirement will be lower than for their non-dynastic counterparts. As before, if dynastic women have an advantage over dynastic men will be dependent on the model parameters.

![Diagram showing the relationship between actual competence and perceived competence.]

Figure C.1: Relationship between actual competence and perceived competence.
Figure C.2: Generational shift in nature of relationship of female dynastic politicians in Ireland.

Note: Only one wife was not also a widow. Not included are a handful of sisters.
C.3 Quota analysis

Figure C.3: Trends in women’s numeric representation in local-level Social Democratic Parties.

Note: Councils are divided by above- and below-median council size. The x-axis denotes election year and the y-axis shows the average percentage of seats on local assemblies held by women. The vertical lines mark the introduction of the zipper quota in 1994.
Table C.2: OLS regression models (with difference-in-difference estimation) of the quota impact on the proportion of dynastic elected women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Including Non-Compliers</th>
<th>Excluding Non-Compliers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 = Reference</td>
<td>All Women Men</td>
<td>All Women Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988*Quota impact</td>
<td>0.03 0.09 0.06</td>
<td>0.08 0.11 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13) (0.2) (0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15) (0.23) (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994*Quota impact</td>
<td>0.14 0.33* -0.01</td>
<td>0.07 0.27 -0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11) (0.17) (0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13) (0.2) (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998*Quota impact</td>
<td>0.11 0.31 -0.01</td>
<td>0.07 0.32 -0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14) (0.22) (0.17)</td>
<td>(0.16) (0.25) (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002*Quota impact</td>
<td>0.01 0.05 0.08</td>
<td>0.06 0.15 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12) (0.19) (0.17)</td>
<td>(0.13) (0.22) (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006*Quota impact</td>
<td>0.05 0.13 0.02</td>
<td>0 0.13 -0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14) (0.21) (0.19)</td>
<td>(0.15) (0.24) (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*Quota impact</td>
<td>-0.03 -0.05 0.08</td>
<td>-0.06 -0.06 -0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14) (0.2) (0.19)</td>
<td>(0.16) (0.23) (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>12,017 6,232 5,785</td>
<td>9,347 4,924 4,423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality-election period level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects.