Working Paper
Sean Gailmard. Working Paper. “"Building a New Imperial State: Agency Problems and Separation of Powers in English North America"”.Abstract

This paper explores the strategic foundations of separation of powers in the English empire of North America. A hierarchical principal-agent model of this setting demonstrates that imperial governors may extract more rents from colonial settlers than the imperial crown prefers. This lowers the crown's own rents, and inhibits economic development by settlers. Separation of powers within colonies allows settlers to restrain the governor at low direct cost to the crown. This restraint shrinks the share of the economy extracted jointly by the governor and the crown, but may thereby induce greater economic development. When eciency gains of extracting from a larger pie outweigh distributive losses from a smaller crown share, the crown supports separation of powers within colonies. The model highlights the role of agency problems as a distinct factor in New World institutional development.

Tommaso Aquilante. Working Paper. “"Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US"”. aquilante2015.pdf
Ceren Baysan. Working Paper. “Can More Information Lead to More Voter Polarization? Experimental Evidence from Turkey”.Abstract
This study shows how efforts in persuasive communication affect voter participation in the deterioration of democratic norms in Turkey. I do this by estimating the effect of two randomized door-to-door information campaigns on voter behavior. The campaigns reached over 260,000 voters right before a referendum on institutional changes to weaken constraints on the executive branch. The party opposing the referendum delivered messages on either economy and terrorism related policy outcomes or implications of the institutional change. Each campaign had a zero average effect, but increased political polarization due to heterogeneous effects. These effects persisted fourteen months later in two elections.
Michal Bauer, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilova, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, and Tamar Mitts. Working Paper. “"Can War Foster Cooperation?"”.Abstract

In the past decade, nearly 20 studies have found a strong, persistent pattern in surveys and behavioral experiments from over 40 countries: individual exposure to war violence tends to increase social cooperation at the local level, including community participation and prosocial behavior. Thus while war has many negative legacies for individuals and societies, it appears to leave a positive legacy in terms of local cooperation and civic engagement. We discuss, synthesize and reanalyze the emerging body of evidence, and weigh alternative explanations. There is some indication that war violence especially enhances in-group or "parochial" norms and preferences, a finding that, if true, suggests that the rising social cohesion we document need not promote broader peace.

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and Gita Gopinath. Working Paper. “Cash and the Economy: Evidence from India's Demonetization (under revision for the QJE)”.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Gita Gopinath, Prachi Mishra, and Abhinav Narayanan. Working Paper. “Cash and the Economy: Evidence from India's Demonetization under revision for the QJE”.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and Gita Gopinath. Working Paper. “Cash and the Economy: Evidence from India's Demonetization (under revision for the QJE)”.
Yannick Pengl, Philip Roessler, and Valeria Rueda. Working Paper. “Cash Crops, Print Technologies and the Politicization of Ethnicity in Africa”. pengl_et_al_ethnicity_in_africa.pdf
Natalie Eslick. Working Paper. CEDAW Article Brief Descriptions. Initiative on VAW, Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School.Abstract

This document provides short summaries of the articles of CEDAW.

Working Paper. CEDAW - OP Article 8 chart - Optional Protocol "Article 8 Inquiry". Initiative on VAW, Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School.Abstract

This chart visualizes the inquiry process for article 8 of CEDAW. 

Mischa Karplus. Working Paper. CEDAW Reservations: Family. Initiative on VAW, Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School.Abstract

A list of all countries with reservations on CEDAW pertaining to the family.

Bastiaan Bruinsma and Kostas Gemenis. Working Paper. “Challenging the Manifesto Project data monopoly: Estimating policy position time-series using expert and mass survey data”.Abstract
Whenever researchers need to test theories and hypotheses using longitudinal data of political parties’ ideological and policy placement, they have little choice. Researchers are often constrained to use the Manifesto Project data, despite the extensive evidence that has challenged its reliability and validity. In this paper we show that it is possible to construct a unique and rich time-series of policy placements by combining expert and mass survey data, and addressing the problem of missing values through the Amelia II multiple imputation algorithm. Using data from Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece, we estimate the positions of parties on the left-right dimension and on a two-dimensional (socio-economic and socio-cultural) space, and show how the estimates outperform the Manifesto Project estimates in terms of their face validity.
Sophie Litschwartz and Luke Miratrix. Working Paper. “Characterizing Cross-Site Variation in Local Average Treatment Effects in Multisite RDD contexts with an Application to Massachusetts High School Exit Exam”.Abstract
      Multisite studies are a commonly used way to assess how a treatment works across contexts. In multisite random controlled trials (RCT), cross-site treatment effect variance is a way to quantify treatment effect variation. However, there are no standard methods for estimating cross-site treatment effect variation designed to be used in multisite regression discontinuity designs (RDD). In this research, we rectify this gap in the literature by developing and evaluating two methods for estimate cross-site treatment effect variance in RDDs. The first method combines a fixed intercepts/random coefficients (FIRC) model with a local linear RDD analysis. The second method borrows techniques from random effects meta-analysis and employs them with the RDD model. We find that although the FIRC model may look appealing ex-post to a researcher because it has a smaller confidence interval than the random effects meta-analysis model, simulations show the FIRC model estimates of the cross-site treatment effect standard deviation have substantial bias, poor coverage, and lack well defined confidence intervals. In contrast, the random effects meta-analysis estimates of the cross-site treatment effect standard deviation have good coverage across a range of conditions. We then apply these models to a high school exit exam policy in Massachusetts that required students who passed the high school exit exam but were still determined to be nonproficient to complete a Education Proficiency Plan". We find that students on the margin of proficiency required to complete an Education Proficiency Plan in math were seven percentage points more likely to complete a math course their senior year. However, if we assume normality, the cross-high school treatment effect standard deviation was high enough in three cohorts for the treatment effect to have been negative in more than a third of high schools. 
Litschwartz Miratrix Multi-Site RDD
David de la Croix, Matthias Doepke, and Joel Mokyr. Working Paper. “"Clans, Guilds, and Markets: Apprenticeship Institutions and Growth in the Pre-Industrial Economy"”. delacroixetal2016.pdf
Stefan Huebner. Working Paper. “Climate Change from Below the Waves: Why We Need an Oceanic History of Global East Asia in the Anthropocene”. huebner_climate_change_from_below_the_waves.pdf
Robert C. Allen and Leander Heldring. Working Paper. “"The Collapse of the World's Oldest Civilization: The Political Economy of Hydraulic States and the Financial Crisis of the Abbasid Caliphate”. allenheldring2016.pdf
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, David C. Parkes, and Richard Steinberg. Working Paper. “Combinatorial Auctions in Practice”. SSRN
Antonio Henriques and Nuno Palma. Working Paper. “Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800”.Abstract

Why did the countries that first benefited from access to the New World – Castile and Portugal – decline relative to their followers, especially England and the Netherlands? The dominant narrative is that worse initial institutions at the time of the opening of the Atlantic trade explain the Iberian divergence. In this paper, we build a new dataset which allows for a comparison of institutional quality over time. We consider the frequency and nature of parliamentary meetings, the frequency and intensity of extraordinary taxation and coin debasement, and real interest rates and spreads for public debt. We find no evidence that the political institutions of Portugal and Spain were worse until the English Civil War.

Paul Hallwood. Working Paper. “The Confederacy and the American Civil War, 1881-1865: Greed or Grievance?”.Abstract
A contribution to the literature on the causes of civil war, specifically the American Civil War, 1861 – 1865, looking from the secessionist’s side. A model is developed allowing for the quantification of greed (retention of income flows deriving from the system of slavery) and grievance (assertion of state’s rights) as causes of Confederacy secession. War costs and preferences over how quickly war costs needed to be recouped are central in the analysis. A key finding is, even if the Confederate states did not under-estimate war costs, there was still a strong case for attempting secession to protect the economic return on slavery.
While in many scenarios this makes it unnecessary to invoke willingness to pay to assert state’s rights, this too is not ruled out, but it is reasoned that greed was quantitatively the stronger motive. Given sufficient data the methodology can be applied to quantify motives in other civil wars.
Isabela Mares and Didac Queralt. Working Paper. “"The Conservative Origin of Income Taxation"”.Abstract

This paper examines the adoption of income taxes by Western economies since
the 19th century. We identify two empirical regularities that challenge predictions of existing models of taxation and redistribution: while countries with low levels of electoral enfranchisement and high levels of landholding inequality adopt the income tax first, countries with more extensive electoral rules lag behind in adopting these new forms of taxation. We propose an explanation of income tax adoption that accounts for these empirical regularities. We discuss the most important economic consideration of politicians linked to owners of different factors, namely, the shift of the tax burden between sectors, and examine how pre-existing electoral rules affect these political calculations. The paper provides both a cross-national test of this argument and a micro-historical test that examines the economic and political determinants of support for the adoption of the income tax in 1842 in Britain.