Yasuzō 鈴木安蔵 Suzuki. 1941. Nihon kenpōshi gaisetsu 日本憲法史概説. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha.
Kingo 小早川欣吾 Kobayakawa. 1940. Meiji hōsei shiron kōhō no bu 明治法制史論公法之部. Tokyo: Ganshōdō.
Shin 淸水伸 Shimizu. 1940. Teikoku kenpō seitei kaigi 帝国憲法制定会議. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Shin 清水伸 Shimizu. 1939. Doku-ō ni okeru Itō Hirobumi no kenpō torishirabe to Nihon kenpō 獨墺に於ける 伊藤博文の憲法取調べと日本憲法. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Ikujirō 渡邊幾治郎 Watanabe. 1939. Nihon kenpō seitei shikō 日本憲法制定史講. Tokyo: Chikura Shobō.
Hirobumi 伊藤博文 Itō. 1938. Teikoku kenpō kōshitsu tempan gikai 帝國憲法皇室典範義解. 18th ed. Tokyo: Maruzen Kabushiki Gaisha.
R.H. Coase. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4, Pp. 386.Abstract
Economics and laypeople use the term 'firm' differently. In explicitly defining both usages, Coase (1937) reconciles the gap between the idea that the price mechanism controls the allocation of resources within a market and the idea that conscious power, in the form of the entrepreneur, must do so. The entrepreneur embodies both initiative, or forecasting people's desires, and management, or responding to market forces. The relationships that form when an entrepreneur directs resources define a firm. Firms may emerge when uncertainty allows buyers to dictate longer term contracts, when an entrepreneur can save marketing costs, and/or when government regulations like sales tax encourage it. Coase critiques a number of definitions of firms and explanations of their birth and growth. Usher and Dobb argue that the division of labor engenders the firm's emergence, but the price mechanism is already an 'integrating force in a differentiated economy.' The real question is why the entrepreneur should replace the price mechanism as the integrating force. Knight argues that uncertainty breeds a group that guarantees wages. Coase objects for two reasons. Not only do knowledge and expertise become commodities, Knight also hypothesizes that it would be impractical for one to purchase goods or services without supervising the work. But contracts illustrate the flaw: first, expertise and knowledge can be purchased via a contract; second, purchasers don't necessarily - and often don't - supervise contracted labor. Thus Knight's conceptualization cannot explain why the entrepreneur should supercede the price mechanism. Coase examines how firms grow: many assume that a firm's size is limited if its cost curve slopes upward under perfect competition, because it will not pay for more output than can be produced when marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The proposition fails to explain not only why a market contains more than one variety of a good, but also that there may be a point at which producing a new product is less costly than an old one. Four factors determine firm growth: the cost of using the market, the cost of organizing different entrepreneurs, the number, and finally the quantity produced. These definitions approximate the firm's organization. The question will always be whether it pays for the entrepreneur to take on additional costs and therefore grow. At the margin, the costs of organizing under the firm will equal the costs of organizing within the firm or of allowing the price mechanism to organize it. Businesses will continue to experiment, maintaining equilibrium. While equilibrium implies a static market, dynamic factors are also present; changing costs within both a firm and the larger market explain changes in firm size. This theory of moving equilibrium allows for a better understanding of the entrepreneur, who both innovates and manages. (RAS)
Kenneth Colegrove. 1937. “The Japanese Constitution.” The American Political Science Review, vol.31, Pp. 1027-1049.
Kentarō 金子堅太郎 Kaneko. 1937. Kenpō seitei to Ōbeijin no hyōron 憲法制定と歐米人の評論. Tokyo: Nihon Seinenkan.
Keitarō 北浦圭太郎 Kitaura. 1936. Kokutei kyōkasho to teikoku kenpō 國定敎科書と帝國憲法. Tokyo: Bunshodō.
Kishio 里見岸雄 Satomi. 1936. Teikoku kenpō shin kō 帝國憲法新講. 11th ed. Tokyo: Nishōdō.
Yasuzō 鈴木安蔵 Suzuki. 1935. Kenpō kaishaku shiryō: Dai Nihon Teikoku kenpō happu tōji no ippan kenpō shisō o ukagaubeki chikujō kenpō kaishaku bunken 憲法解釈資料: 大日本帝国憲法発布当時 の一般憲法思想を窺ふべき逐条憲法解釈文献. Ed. Meiji Seijishi Kenkyūkai 明治政治史研究会. Tokyo: Naukasha.
Yasuzō 鈴木安蔵 Suzuki. 1935. Nihon kenpōshi kenkyū 日本憲法史研究. Tokyo: Sōbunkaku.
George Newman. 1935. “Readjustments In Medical Study: The Medical Curriculum.” The British Medical JournalThe British Medical Journal, 2, 3902, Pp. 711-714. Publisher's Version
Shinkichi 上杉慎吉 Uesugi. 1935. Teikoku kenpō chikujō kōgi 帝国憲法逐条講義. Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha.
Kinzo 山野金蔵 Yamano. 1935. Teikoku kenpō 帝國憲法. Rev. 7th ed. Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
Hirobumi 伊藤博文 Itō and Hiratsuka Atsushi 平塚篤. 1933. Hisho ruisan (kōtei) 秘書類纂 (校訂). Tokyo: Hisho Ruisan Kankōkai.
Chō 淸水澄 Shimizu. 1932. Teikoku kenpō kōgi: chikujō 帝国憲法講義: 逐条. Tokyo: Shōkadō Shoten.
Jintarō 藤井甚太郎 Fujii. 1929. Nihon kenpō seiteishi 日本憲法制定史. Tokyo: Yūzankaku.
Georges D Cioriceanu. 1928. Les grands ports de Roumanie. Paris. cioriceanu.pdf